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A case-study on project-level CO2 mitigation costs in
industrialised countries - the Climate Cent Foundation in
Switzerland
Abstract
We analyse CO2 emissions reduction costs based on project data from the Climate Cent Foundation
(CCF), a climate policy instrument in Switzerland. We draw four conclusions. First, for the projects
investigated, the CCF on average pays € 63/t. Due to the Kyoto Protocol, the CCF buys reductions until
2012 only. This cutoff increases reported per ton reduction costs, as the additional lifetime project costs
are set in relation to reductions until 2012 only, rather than to reductions realised over the whole
lifetime. Lifetime reduction costs are € 45/t. Second, correlation between CCF's payments and lifetime
reduction costs per ton is low. Projects with low per ton reduction costs should thus be identified based
on lifetime per ton reduction costs. Third, the wide range of project costs per ton observed casts doubts
on the widely used identification of the merit order of reduction measures based on average per ton costs
for technology types. Finally, the CCF covers only a fraction of additional reduction costs. Decisions to
take reduction efforts thus depend on additional, non observable and/or non-economic motives. Any
generalisation of results has to consider that this analysis is based on prospective costs of a sub-sample
of projects in Switzerland.
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We analyse CO2 emissions reduction costs based on project data from the Climate Cent 
Foundation (CCF), a climate policy instrument in Switzerland. We draw four conclusions. 
First, for the projects investigated, the CCF on average pays € 63/t. Due to the Kyoto 
Protocol, the CCF buys reductions until 2012 only. This cutoff increases reported per ton 
reduction costs, as the additional lifetime project costs are set in relation to reductions until 
2012 only, rather than to reductions realised over the whole lifetime. Lifetime reduction costs 
are € 45/t. Second, correlation between CCF's payments and lifetime reduction costs per ton 
is low. Projects with low per ton reduction costs should thus be identified based on lifetime 
per ton reduction costs. Third, the wide range of project costs per ton observed casts doubts 
on the widely used identification of the merit order of reduction measures based on average 
per ton costs for technology types. Finally, the CCF covers only a fraction of additional 
reduction costs. Decisions to take reduction efforts thus depend on additional, non observable 
and/or non-economic motives. Any generalisation of results has to consider that this analysis 
is based on prospective costs of a sub-sample of projects in Switzerland. 
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mitigation costs; 
 
Abbreviations: CCF: Climate Cent Foundation; GHG: Greenhouse gas; m: million; s.d.: standard 
deviation 
Introduction 
 
Like most industrialised countries, Switzerland has ambitious greenhouse gas (GHG) 
reduction goals (-8% from 1990 levels by 2012). Which policy instruments are best 
suited to reach those and how much this will cost are key questions of climate policy. 
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Information on reduction costs per ton CO2 and other GHGs is thus an important input to 
ongoing discussions on concrete design of mitigation policies in any industrialised 
country. In this paper, we add a piece of information on how expensive domestic 
reductions are. In addition, we shed some light on the functioning of one specific climate 
policy instrument, namely the “Climate Cent Foundation” (CCF; “Stiftung 
Klimarappen”), a project subsidy scheme in Switzerland. In contrast to many other 
studies on mitigation costs, our assessment is based on data of 96 single projects and not 
on aggregate or hypothetical assessment based on a low number of case studies or expert 
opinions only. It is, however, prospective data as provided by the project design 
documents of the projects supported by the CCF. Realized mitigation costs thus may be 
adapted retrospectively after running those projects for some years. 
Although of high importance for policy making, there is limited information on 
costs of mitigation measures in industrialised countries. Most assessments are based on 
average costs of technology types or on test projects rather than on a significant number 
of real-world projects. Examples of such analysis for CO2 are Koschel et al. 2006, BMU 
2007, ISI 2007, Ürge-Vorsatz and Novikova 2008, GAINS 2009a. Prominently discussed 
and very detailed and encompassing is the recent report by McKinsey on mitigation costs 
and potential in Germany (McKinsey 2007). It analyses mitigation costs and potentials in 
several sectors, assessing around 300 single measures. The analysis is based on estimated 
and forecasted costs per technology type. In combination with estimated potential per 
technology type, an abatement cost curve is then built. Cost information for technology 
types seems to stem from the relevant industries and experts, but it is not clearly stated 
(neither in the appendices nor in the references on the method). It is also unclear, whether 
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costs per technology type are marginal or average costs, we thus assume that it rather 
refers to average costs (the short description BDI 2007 and the newly released 2nd version 
of the global model, McKinsey 2009a, have some indications that it is average costs). A 
similar analysis as for Germany was undertaken for Switzerland (less detailed), the US, 
Australia, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Brazil, Belgium, China and globally. Analysis 
for further countries will be added (McKinsey 2009b, Enkvist et al. 2007). A recent 
workshop at IIASA compared the McKinsey study and other similarly detailed abatement 
cost estimation models, such as GAINS from IIASA (GAINS 2009b). For most cases, 
McKinsey (2007) report comparatively higher costs than other studies. A very 
comprehensive report on non-CO2 greenhouse gases containing mitigation cost curves is 
EPA (2006). As many binding mitigation policies are only in place since a few years, 
encompassing analysis of costs based on implemented measures may be available in 
some years only. Some project level studies exist, though, e.g. for the building sector 
(e.g. Jakob 2006). 
Due to the flexibility mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol, GHG reductions need, 
however, not necessarily to be realized domestically, but can be bought abroad, either in 
other countries with reduction goals (Emissions Trading ET and Joint Implementation JI) 
or in countries without such, i.e. mainly developing countries (Clean Development 
Mechanism CDM). This possibility to realise reductions abroad is important when 
assessing mitigation costs in industrialised countries, as these flexibility mechanisms 
have the potential to considerably lower compliance costs to reach the reduction goals. 
Currently (as of September 2009), the prices for permits in the EU Emissions market are 
around 15 € (but the volatility is high; during the last twelve months, permits traded as 
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low as for 8 € and as high as for 28 €).1 Estimates for abatement measures abroad (in 
developing countries) are largely below these values (e.g. Wetzelaer et a. 2007, who 
report reductions of 1.8 Gt CO2eq below 6-7 € in 2010, or UBA 2007, reporting 1 Gt 
CO2eq below 5 € in 2010 from non CO2 projects, and most options for CO2 projects 
below 15 €, but no clear numbers on the amount; in 2007, 1$ ≈ 0.7 €). Estimates for costs 
of most domestic measures in Germany with positive costs are at 25 €/t CO2eq and more 
and thus lie above these values (McKinsey 2007). Such data lie behind the commonly 
held view that reductions abroad are less expensive than domestic reductions. 
On the other hand, it is sometimes claimed that reductions in developing countries 
may be more insecure than domestic reductions. In addition, parts of society hold strong 
moral attitudes that reductions should not be incurred abroad, as a society should clean up 
its own pollution without buying its way out of responsibility. Finally, there is the often 
neglected fact that many reduction measures come at negative costs if calculated 
correctly (see e.g. McKinsey 2007, 2009b). This is the case for measures in the building 
sector, for example, which have a high initial investment but a long lifetime of several 
decades without variable costs (e.g. insulation measures reducing oil consumption for 
heating). Depending on the oil price, the net present value of the additional costs of these 
reduction measures becomes negative sooner or later and they thus become profitable. 
In our analysis, we get average lifetime reduction costs per ton CO2 of around € 
452 (see table 3 for definitions of the variables used in this paper), while the official 
expectation of costs for the CCF is 62.5 € per ton (CHF 100.-, CCF 2007a), which 
parallels the actual costs the CCF on average pays per ton CO2 in our sample, namely € 
63.1. This difference arises because, due to the Kyoto Protocol, the CCF sets lifetime 
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additional costs in relation to emissions reductions until 2012 only, while a consistent per 
ton cost assessment should relate lifetime additional costs to lifetime reductions. In 
addition to gaining information on mitigation costs, this investigation of the CCF thus 
sheds light on some important features of instrument design for mitigation policies, such 
as the problem of differing time-horizons of policy measures for project support and the 
lifetimes of these projects.  
In the following section, the CCF is presented. The data is described in section 3. 
Section 4 presents descriptive analysis of forecast data on costs and emissions of 96 
projects procured under the CCF. Section 5 concludes. 
We emphasise that all cost data for the CCF in this paper are based on project-
wise net present values of current and future costs. We also emphasise, that these costs 
are very sensitive to the presence of outliers (see section 4; for the values reported above, 
outliers are excluded). A further caveat is that the representativeness of the costs of the 
projects investigated hinges on the absence of any selection bias. The data clearly shows 
some bias regarding type of projects, but we do not have enough information to assess 
presence or absence of further selection bias within a given type. The “winner's curse”, 
for example, a known pattern in such mechanisms for procurement as the CCF partly 
uses (basically a common value auction), may lead to selection of projects with 
unrealistically low cost expectations. On the other hand, this pattern seems unlikely in the 
case of the CCF, given the cost levels observed. 
Swiss CO2 Policy and the Climate Cent Foundation 
Ratifying the Kyoto Protocol in 2003, Switzerland agreed on GHG emissions reductions 
of 8% with respect to base level emissions in 1990 by 2008-2012, which were 52.80 
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million (m) t CO2 equivalents (the newest emissions data available is for 2007, reporting 
51.26 m t CO2 equivalents, BAFU 2009). To meet this goal, reductions of 4.22 m t CO2 
equivalents each year from 2008 to 2012 need to be realised. Nationally, this goal is in 
line with the so-called “CO2-law” from 2000, which is also the most important measure 
to implement the Kyoto goals in Switzerland. The CO2-law requests the reduction of 
CO2-emissions from energetic use of fossil combustibles and fuels by 10% with respect 
to the level of 1990 in 2010.3 Relevant are the annual average emissions over 2008-2012 
(CO2-law, Art. 2 Abs. 1-2).  
It was planned that voluntary measures would reach these goals (CO2-law, Art. 3, 
Abs.1). In case the goals will not be reached by voluntary measures alone, though, a tax 
on CO2-emissions from fossil energy sources will be levied (CO2-law, Art 3. Abs.2). 
Examples of voluntary measures are the voluntary agreements on reductions between 
companies and the state and the program “EnergieSchweiz” to increase energy efficiency 
and support renewable energy (BUWAL 2005, North et al. 2007, UVEK 2007a). Due to 
slower reductions in aggregate national emissions than planned, such a tax was 
introduced on fossil heating fuels (not on fossil transportation fuels) at a level of  7.5 €/t 
CO2 (12 CHF/t) from January 1, 2008 onwards, which will be increased to 22.5 €/t CO2 
(36 CHF/t) from January 1, 2010 onwards (UVEK 2007c, UVEK 2009). 
The Climate Cent Foundation 
The Climate Cent Foundation CCF has to be seen in the light of these voluntary measures 
of the CO2-law. It was initiated as such in 2002 by the interest group of oil importers 
(Erdölvereinigung) with the support of other industry groups such as EconomieSuisse 
(the largest umbrella organization representing the Swiss economy), Strasse Schweiz 
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(Swiss road traffic association) and Schweizerischer Gewerbeverband (a Swiss trade and 
crafts association), and was accepted by the government as an alternative to a direct fee 
on CO2 emissions from fossil transportation fuels after several assessments of 
realisability and scope (Factor 2002, Prognos 2002, Infras 2003, UVEK 2005, Arquit 
Niederberger 2005, Thalmann and Baranzini 2006). The final implementation occurs via 
a fee of 1.5 Swiss pence (1 eurocent) per litre of gasoline and Diesel imported into 
Switzerland. This amount is one point of criticism against the CCF, as it does not harvest 
the price effect on consumption, which a higher tax on CO2 would effectuate.4 The 
revenues from the CCF are then used to finance CO2-emissions reduction measures in 
Switzerland and abroad. With these revenues, the CCF should reduce a total of 9 m tCO2 
until 2012, whereof at most 8 m t can be reduced abroad and at least 1 m t have to be 
realised through domestic measures (CCF 2007a). The CCF has to report periodically on 
its performance. A first assessment of the CCF in September 2007 was positive (UVEK 
2007b). In a recent supplemental agreement with the Swiss government, it was agreed 
that the CCF will realise additional 0.6 m tCO2 reductions annually from 2008 until 
2012, whereof 0.2 m tCO2 have to be realised domestically. These additional reductions 
will be financed by the strategic reserves of the CCF (CCF 2009a). 
According to the business plan from June 2007, the CCF expects revenues of 464 
m € in the period 2005 to 2013, during which the CCF is active. Costs for projects and 
administration in this same period are estimated to 393 m €. 94% thereof (369 m €) are 
used for financing reduction measures, while 6% (24 m €) are used for the administrative, 
acquisition, monitoring etc. work of the CCF (CCF 2007b). It is expected that from 2008 
to 2012, 12.7 m t CO2-emissions reductions will be financed. The CCF would thus have 
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overcompliance of its reduction goal of 9 m t CO2, which hedges against the risk of 
undersupply from contracted projects (CCF 2007a). Adding emission reductions realised 
before 2008, the total emissions reductions realized until the end of 2012 will be 12.98 m 
t CO2 (CCF 2007b).  
About 79% of all planned reductions, that is 10.25 m t CO2, are planned to be 
acquired abroad, via the CDM. For this, 137 m € will be used (thereof 2.5 m € for 
acquisition, monitoring and implementation). The expected average price for reductions 
abroad is thus about 13 € per ton CO2 (CCF 2007b).     
The remaining 21% in reductions will be realised by domestic measures in 
Switzerland. For this, the CCF has three programs, one aimed at increased energy 
efficiency in the building sector, one based on voluntary targets of individual companies 
and the third on various projects in the area of renewable energy and energy efficiency 
that can apply for funding. The building sector program will reduce 0.39 m t CO2 by 
2012 at average costs of 280.- €/t CO2. Voluntary targets will contribute 1.14 m t CO2 
from 2008 to 2012 at an average cost of 58 €/t CO2, and the single projects program will 
reduce 0.95 m t CO2 by 2012. Average costs are expected to be around 62.5 €/t CO2 
(CCF 2007a). In total, the CCF reduces 2.48 m t CO2 from 2008-2012 in Switzerland, at 
total costs of about 235 m €. Adding emissions reductions already realised in the years 
2006 and 2007 (CCF started operation in 2005), the total domestic reduction planned is 
2.73 m t CO2 (CCF 2007b). 
The Single Projects Program of the Climate Cent Foundation 
Due to data availability and comparability, we restrict the analysis on the single project 
program. More details on this program are provided here. Acquisition of projects is done 
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through three channels, via auctions, brokers (intermediaries) and direct identification of 
promising single large-scale projects. Support is available for projects in the areas of 
renewable energy for residential heating and process heat, waste heat utilization, 
efficiency increase in industrial processes, renewable automotive fuels, efficiency 
increase in fuel use and changes towards more sustainable transportation patterns (CCF 
2006). No support is available for research and development, projects that switch 
between different types of fossil fuels or projects related to power generation (CCF 
2007b).  
The CCF works via compensation paid to the projects for each ton CO2 reduced. 
Payment is effected after verification of the emissions reductions. In the application for 
support by the CCF, the project partner fixes the amount of support per ton CO2 reduced 
requested. The level of this support per ton is the key decisive variable for acceptance or 
decline of a proposal. 5  
Requirements for funding by the CCF are the same as for mitigation projects in 
the context of the Kyoto Protocol, such as the CDM. Central criteria are additionality and 
monitoring with verification of emissions reductions (CCF 2007b). Additionality is given 
in case the project leads to reductions otherwise not realised (physical additionality) and 
in case the project would not have been realized without the support of the CCF 
(financial additionality). For the monitoring and verification, reductions must be 
measurable and verifiably causally related to the project activity. This verification has to 
be undertaken by independent experts on annual basis following previously accepted 
methods. Besides these key criteria, there are further additional criteria that have to be 
fulfilled (see table 1). In practice, it is also required that the compensation from the CCF 
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covers at least 10% of the additional costs of the project. This is based on the assumption 
that projects with lower coverage are not additional as such a small contribution is not 
expected to be decisive for the implementation decision.  
 
Insert table 1 here. 
 
The process of identification of promising projects is different for the three 
channels. In the auctions channel, projects of at least 1'000 t reduction between 2008 and 
2012 can apply. Applications are possible at several dates, according to the different 
auctions planned. Some assessment of the proposals in form and content is undertaken by 
the CCF, which then decides on admission to the auction. For each auction, a total of 
financial means available is fixed by the CCF. Project proposals admitted to the auction 
are then ordered according to increasing specific costs as claimed by the project owners 
(CCF 2007b). Until the end of 2008, eight auctions were hold for a total of 29 m € (CCF 
2008, 2009b). Expected indirect costs of the auctions (experts for the screening; 
implementation of the auction, which is outsourced) amounted to 0.9 m € (4.8% of the 
total financial means for the auctions) (CCF 2007b).  
In the intermediaries channel (open until June 2007), seven organizations were 
contracted for providing adequate projects, that reduce at least 500 t in the period of 
2008-2012. A preliminary screening as in the auctions program takes place and then 
support is decided based on the specific funds per ton CO2 reduced requested (CCF 
2007b). Intermediaries get a provision for each project finally accepted. This provision 
depends on the costs per ton reduced (determined as shortly described in footnote 5) and 
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is higher for cheaper projects (CCF 2007b, Appendix 3.23). This sets incentives for 
intermediaries to provide cheaper projects. A total of 16.4 m € is allocated to the 
intermediaries program, whereof 15.6 m € (95.4%) are reserved for project support and 
0.8 m € (4.6%) for provisions and for costs of external experts (CCF 2007b).  
The third channel consists of large-scale projects that reduce more than 10'000 t 
CO2 between 2008-2012. Acquisition is done by the CCF itself and the quality 
assessment is the same as for the other types of projects (CCF 2007b). 25 m € in total are 
planned for such large scale projects, wherefrom 0.06 m € (0.2%) are used for project 
acquisition and administration (CCF 2007b). This channel has thus lowest indirect costs, 
while it can be expected that costs incurred by the CCF itself are higher than for the other 
channels. These are, however, not included in the indirect costs and neither listed 
separately anywhere else.  
According to the annual reports for 2007 and 2008 (CCF 2007, 2008), indirect 
costs were somewhat higher than expected (7.2% in 2007, 5.4% in 2008, not 
differentiated for the three channels, though). 
The Data 
The data is drawn from several sources from the CCF. A central source are the project 
development documents (PDD) filed in by the project developer. A second central 
document are the calculations for additionality. The third central document is the internal 
CO2 account of the CCF for each project. These sources partly contain the same 
variables, which led to some inconsistencies between values from different sources. This 
could partly be explained by internal processes that updated information only in parts of 
these sources because the other were not relevant anymore. After consulting the CCF, we 
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thus decided to take general information on the projects from the PDD, data on costs 
from the additionality calculations and data on reductions from the internal CO2-
assessment. Further inconsistencies in the data that emerged during processing could 
mostly be resolved by discussion with the CCF. Where this has not been possible, the 
project was deleted from the analysis.  
The data available for analysis thus contains several characteristics of the projects 
and forecasts on costs and emissions reductions, both with respect to some fictional 
reference scenario, which is calculated according to some predefined methods provided 
by CCF.6 Due to the legal security of the Kyoto Protocol ending in 2012, the CCF only 
buys reductions until 2012, and emissions and emissions reductions were projected until 
2012 only. For the calculations over the whole project lifetime, we decided to insert the 
values for the year 2012 for all subsequent years until the end of the project lifetime. This 
is a conservative assumption regarding emissions reductions incurred, as some project 
may reach full reduction capacity only after 2012. The calculated specific reduction costs 
per ton are thus rather an upper bound. This is further accentuated as the project lifetime 
reported in the PDD is an imputed value for the depreciation of the installation. Usually, 
the physical capital stays in operation and correspondingly produces emissions reductions 
for some additional years. Due to the data being forecasts, real emissions and costs 
necessarily will somewhat deviate and true assessment of reduction costs will only be 
possible after completion of the projects.   
We restrict the analysis to projects contracted for reductions, as information for 
the projects in the application process is often subject to changes and thus less reliable 
and complete. In addition, we are only interested in projects that are implemented, which 
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is only given for projects under contract. The basic data set consisted in 102 projects 
contracted under the single project programme (as of mid-October 2007). 5 thereof were 
deleted due to missing data. An additional project was deleted because the project owner 
withdrew the project. In total, we thus have data from 96 projects for the analysis, which 
reduce 0.5 m t CO2 by 2012 (1.3 m t over the whole lifetimes of the projects). The 
projects are mainly from the intermediaries channel (78). 14 are from the auctions and 4 
are large-scale projects. More projects from the latter two channels have since been 
contracted, as there were additional auctions until the end of 2008 and also acquisition of 
large-scale projects continued, while acquisition through the intermediaries channel was 
finished by the end of June 2007. 
Project types and their frequency in the data are listed in table 2. Most projects are 
from the category renewable heat production, which is at least partly due to the most 
active intermediaire procuring almost only such projects - the Swiss umbrella 
organization for wood energy (Verein Holzenergie Schweiz: Dachorganisation der 
Schweizer Holzenergiebranche). Project ownership is diverse, but a third is owned by 
municipalities (29 district heating projects). 30 additional projects are private or company 
owned from the energy sector and the remaining 37 are private and company owned from 
various other sectors.  
 
Insert table 2 here. 
 
The size of the projects varies considerably, 94 projects realize lifetime reductions 
between 330 and 62'000 t with a median of 7'004 t (mean 24'350 t, s.d. 79'400 t). Two 
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outliers realize much higher total reductions, by almost a factor 10 (both over 500'000 t). 
Definitions of and some descriptive statistics for the variables we base our analysis on are 
provided in table 3.  
 
Insert table 3 here. 
Results 
Due to data availability, no econometric analysis of the cost structure of the projects in 
the single project programme was possible. However, even some simple descriptive 
analysis reveals interesting information on the reduction costs per ton CO2 for these 
projects. We emphasise again that all cost information on the CCF provided is based on 
net present value assessments for the projects analysed. I will explicitly mention whether 
outliers are included or not. There are three outliers in the data, two with regard to both 
total lifetime reduction and reductions until 2012, and an additional one with regard to 
lifetime reduction costs per ton (cf. table 3). Depending on the results presented, the first 
two, the last one or all three will be excluded.  
Analysis of the CCF cost data 
We first illustrate what the CCF pays per ton CO2 reduced (pCCF, see figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Payments of the CCF per ton CO2 reduced (pCCF). x-axis: projects arranged 
according to increasing values for pCCF. 
 
Weighted with the reductions produced until 2012, the mean value is € 63.1 
(standard deviation (s.d.) 10.94; median 67.5; this excludes the two outliers in total 
lifetime reduction (see table 3); including those, the weighted mean is 59.3). The 
payments per ton of reduction by the CCF thus largely coincide with the ex-ante 
expectation of the CCF on these mean values and the range of these payments (€ 62.5 
(CCF 2007a), € 30 to 95 (section 8.2.1 in CCF 2006)). A possible explanation is that 
project owners apply for funds largely in this range, as the price expectations of the CCF 
were known.7 The costs paid by the CCF compares to the costs per ton reduced over the 
whole project lifetime (cLT, see figure 2).  
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Figure 2. Costs per ton CO2 reduced, cLT (over the whole lifetime; an outlier at € 280 is 
excluded). x-axis: projects arranged according to increasing values of cLT. 
 
cLT is calculated by division of the discounted additional costs incurred by the 
project with respect to the reference scenario over the whole lifetime divided by the 
emissions reduced over the lifetime. Weighted with the reductions produced over the 
whole lifetime, the mean value for this is € 45.44 (s.d. 30.13; median 40). Here, the three 
outliers are excluded. Including those, the mean value lies at 32.94). It is important to 
note the great influence of the outliers (especially of the two large-scale outliers 
regarding total lifetime reductions). 
The correlation between these two costs is low (0.35) and the mean values differ 
significantly at 1% (t-test, N=94 for each group; including the three outliers, the 
difference is significant only at the 5% level; with weighted data, the difference in means 
is insignificant with the three outliers and nearly significant at the 5% level without). 
Superficially, one might conclude that the CCF pays too much for reductions. But this is 
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not true, as the higher payments can be motivated by the fact that the CCF only pays 
emissions reduced up to 2012, while the project usually runs and produces reductions for 
additional 10 to 15 years8. Accounting for this by dividing total lifetime reduction costs 
by emissions reduced up to 2012 only, gives much higher values (c2012, mean: € 160.6, 
s.d. 140.25; median 131.63; including the three outliers, the mean is € 141), see figure 3.    
 
Figure 3. Costs per ton CO2 in case total lifetime-costs are divided by reductions until 
2012 only, c2012. x-axis: projects arranged according to increasing values of c2012. 
 
These numbers from total cost-recovery by 2012 and the actual payments made 
by the CCF are linked via the coverage rate, which is the quotient of total payments by 
the CCF over total additional costs incurred. The CCF covers part of the additional costs 
only (excluding the three outliers: mean 0.52, s.d. 0.3; median 0.49; weighted mean with 
total lifetime reductions as weights: 0.50), see figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Coverage of the payments of the CCF in relation to total lifetime costs of the 
project (percentage). x-axis: projects arranged according to increasing coverage. 
 
There is a large negative correlation between coverage rates and lifetime 
reduction costs per ton cLT (-0.73) and even more between coverage rates and c2012, i.e. 
lifetime reduction costs divided by emissions until 2012 (-0.80; logarithmic -0.98), see 
figure 5. There are thus high coverage rates for low cost projects and low coverage for 
high cost projects, thus effectuating more similar payments to all projects. This can be 
due to the fact that there are expectations from the CCF regarding costs of reductions. 
The CCF does not look at life time reduction costs or other own cost analysis to decide 
on the funding. There is thus expectedly no large correlation between life time costs per 
ton cLT or coverage and payments by the CCF pCCF (0.35 and -0.3, respectively; all 
numbers without the three outliers).  
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Figure 5. Lifetime reduction costs divided by emissions until 2012 (c2012) vs. coverage of 
the payments of the CCF. 
 
The analysis above refers to direct project costs only. As already mentioned, 
indirect costs for the CCF, incurred through the management of the programs, etc. are 
between 5-7 % of the total financial means of the three programs. The mean value for 
reduction costs per ton thus may by enlarged by the corresponding amount.   
Some further analysis (excluding the three outliers) reveals that there is only weak 
correlation between size of the project (measured in lifetime emissions reductions) and 
lifetime costs per ton cLK (-0.2) or payments by the CCF per ton pCCF (-0.16). The costs of 
the 2 large-size projects with more than 500'000 t lifetime reduction are however among 
the lowest. This information on correlations is a purely descriptive analysis; we 
emphasize again, that due to lack in data, we could not estimate the size and significance 
of the connections between the variables in a full regression model.  
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Furthermore, no significant differences in the mean lifetime reduction costs per 
ton cLT of the different project categories as listed in table 2 can be found (with and 
without the outliers).9 Similarly, there are no significant differences in average costs paid 
by the CCF between the three channels for project acquisition. There, however, the 
means are very similar also at first sight (including outliers), less so but still 
insignificantly different after exclusion of the outliers with lifetime reduction of over 
500'000 t. This contrasts the expectation that intermediaries may provide projects with 
lower costs because the payment structure to the intermediaries sets incentives to provide 
low cost projects. Also here, the impossibility of more sophisticated analysis hinders 
controlling for other influences that may shadow this expected effect.10 
Comparison with abatement cost studies 
As a last analysis, we shortly compare the payments per ton by the CCF (€ 63.-) to the 
costs McKinsey (2007) reports. Much lower reduction costs are reported for most 
measures in the energy and industry sector, not so in the buildings11 and transport sector, 
though. This pattern changes for the energy and industry sector when comparing with the 
lifetime reduction costs we find (€ 45.-), which lie in the mid-range of the McKinsey 
energy sector abatement cost curve and in the lower part for the industry sector. We 
emphasise that McKinsey (2007) addresses measures in Germany and that any analysis 
based on comparison with those should take this into account. To better account for this 
than only by exchange rates, purchase power parity (PPP) comparisons can be employed 
(using data from World Bank 2008). We provide this comparison to Germany, as the 
similar analysis of abatement costs in Switzerland (see McKinsey 2009b) is less detailed. 
For the payments per ton by the CCF (€ 63.-), accounting for PPP leads to € 51.- per ton 
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when using GDP PPP, € 47.- for construction PPP and € 64.- for machinery and 
equipment PPP. The first two of these numbers are then in the mid-range for the energy 
and industry sector. Clearly, this is even more pronounced for the already lower lifetime 
reduction costs of the CCF projects (€ 45.-), which, accounting for PPP, lie in the lower 
part of the McKinsey cost curve for energy and industry (at € 36.- for GDP PPP, € 34.- 
for construction PPP, € 46.- for machinery/equipment PPP). We emphasise that this PPP 
corrected comparison is also only very gross and should be used with due caution. The 
CCF costs may also be higher, as they refer to current costs, while the McKinsey studies 
refer to costs incurred up to 2020 containing some cost-reducing learning effects over the 
years (McKinsey 2007, 2009a). Comparability hinges also on whether costs reported in 
McKinsey (2007) are marginal or average costs. We assume they report average costs per 
technology type. This is not clearly stated, but we assume that estimating marginal costs 
is hindered due to data restrictions. In this case, this comparison with our results is in 
principle legitimate, as both refer to average costs. 
The general patterns of the comparison of CCF costs with McKinsey (2007) are 
further pronounced for other abatement cost models, such as referred in GAINS (2009b), 
as they tend to have lower cost estimates than McKinsey (2007).  
Conclusions 
The CCF helps to establish a price for CO2 reductions in Switzerland. It fulfils its 
requirements and is successful measured against its goals.12 Nevertheless, there is 
potential for improvement, be it for a continuation of the CCF after 2012 or for similar 
instruments in other countries. Potential improvements are related to the four main 
conclusions that can be based on the observations made in the previous section. First, 
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measured in lifetime costs per ton reduced (cLT), domestic projects are cheaper than 
expected when referring to the values per ton reduction the CCF reports, i.e. the 
payments by the CCF, pCCF (€ 45.- in contrast to € 63.-). These lower reduction costs we 
find are linked to the time-frame the projects are evaluated over. The CCF can only buy 
reductions up to 2012, when the Kyoto Protocol and the corresponding legal security end. 
The projects contracted, however, largely run for additional 10 to 15 years. The higher 
costs the CCF reports arise because additional lifetime project costs are put in relation to 
the reductions incurred until 2012 only and not to the total lifetime reductions of the 
project. The lower per ton costs we report stem from relating additional lifetime project 
costs to the total lifetime reductions (cf. table 3 for the definition of these variables).   
This deadline 2012 for accountable credits is given by the structure of the Kyoto 
Protocol. It would be profitable if the CCF could also buy credits for reductions realised 
after 2012. Those could then be used for reduction goals potentially agreed on under a 
future agreement succeeding the Kyoto Protocol. This could be done without further 
costs as the same coverage level per project could be agreed on and the total lifetime cost 
per ton reduction would be the basis for the amount of reductions thus purchased. This 
would result in the same amount of reductions until 2012, and in additional accountable 
reductions afterwards. Calculating this by identifying how many reductions at lifetime 
costs per ton could be purchased from each project with the same financial investment as 
incurred now, this would generate additional 813'000 tons of accountable reductions after 
2012 (while 507'000 t reductions are realised until 2012). This hypothetical assessment is 
based on the assumption that the projects may not be undertaken with lower coverage and 
that the same amount of reductions should be delivered by 2012. This calculation is 
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hypothetical, and it is likely not possible to belatedly change the rules of the CCF to 
somehow use these additional reductions after 2012 which are not counted in any GHG-
account. On the other hand, these reductions realized after 2012 have unplanned positive 
effects for the environment, because the CCF projects thus actually reduce more 
emissions than the amount accounted for till 2012 only. Currently, it is not clear what 
will happen with the reductions realised after 2012.13 
This critique of the CCF is not new. In particular, measures in the building sector 
with a lifetime of several decades and no variable costs (e.g. wall insulation or efficient 
windows) are sensitive to such calculatory cutoffs. We expect that the difference in 
lifetime reduction costs and payments by the CCF are much more pronounced for the 
programs in the building sector (in particular as some of those are expected to be 
profitable over the whole lifetime). In this paper, this critique is supported with concrete 
numbers and the effect of this is quantified. It is understandable that national GHG 
mitigation policies are designed in parallel to the Kyoto Protocol and its time horizon 
2012. On the other hand, the analysis in this paper shows how providing legal security 
beyond 2012 would lead to a more efficient policy. In the case of the CCF, providing this 
legal security could have been possible without additional costs or commitments.   
Second, the missing correlation between lifetime costs and payments by the CCF 
suggests that - if assessed on a lifetime basis - not necessarily the projects with lowest per 
ton reduction costs are funded. The project choice of the CCF is based on a merit order 
according to per ton payments requested by the project owner. Based on life time per ton 
costs, the merit order looks different (see figure 6). Thus, a cut-off for funding based on 
life time per ton costs may include projects that were otherwise dropped and vice versa. 
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With the possibility to also buy and use credits after 2012, an assessment based on 
lifetime per ton costs would avoid a distortion towards projects with higher per ton costs. 
In addition, it should be investigated whether and if so, how much, some cost 
expectations of the CCF that were made public in the course of its development and 
implementation influenced the costs claimed by the project owners. 
 
Figure 6. Lifetime costs per ton cLT vs. payments of the CCF pCCF. 
 
Third, in comparison with the type-wise merit order for Germany, as provided by 
McKinsey (2007) for example, the importance of project-wise cost differences becomes 
clearly visible. Most of the projects in our data are from biomass-based district heating, 
and average lifetime reduction costs per ton lie at € 45, i.e. somewhat above the level of 
“offshore wind” and way above “solid biomass”, higher than “biogas” and “biomass co-
firing” and “onshore wind” in the cost curve for the energy sector in McKinsey (2007).14  
The distribution of lifetime reduction costs for this type, however, spans a range from € 
7.5 to 167, i.e. all of the total positive range assessed in the McKinsey report (this is still 
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valid for PPP corrected values). A more realistic merit order thus probably needs to be 
much more detailed (i.e. on project level), or some within-type distribution of costs 
should be provided for technology-type based merit orders. Furthermore, policies based 
on type-wise average costs are not efficient. Subsidies based on such average costs give 
away rents to low cost projects of this type, while not providing enough means for 
realization of high cost projects. The importance of information on project-level costs is 
further illustrated with the sensitivity of the mean values to large-scale outliers. 
Interesting in this context are also the results from the comparison of Non-Annex I region 
abatement cost estimates with costs of concrete CDM projects in Wetzelaer et al. (2007), 
where coincidence in per ton cost levels is given in half of the cases only (it has to be 
emphasized, though, that a comparison (same country and same project type) was 
possible for 14 cases only). On the other hand, type-wise assessment may be the only 
viable solution for choosing policies of support or priority programs, as ex-ante project-
wise assessment allowing for any type of projects or provision of within-type cost 
distributions would be too expensive or impossible.  
A fourth important result is the observation that project owners seem to decide on 
realisation of a project not only based on financial considerations. Given that the 
coverage rate is considerably below 100% for most projects, project owners actually 
incur additional costs with respect to the base-line. Assuming that the baseline is roughly 
correct, other criteria than maximising profits seem to play an important role. We could 
think of several intuitively appealing story-lines that could be the motivation for this. On 
the other hand, we could also think of some reasoning that also with less than 100% 
coverage, most projects may turn out to be profit maximising (e.g. in case project owners 
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expect that the credits after 2012 can be sold to other parties15). As the data at hand does 
not allow for clarity on the question of project developer motivation, we refrain from 
further interpretation. We only emphasise, that non-economic factors potentially play an 
important role here. 
Acknowledgements: Many thanks to the Climate Cent Foundation for opening its archives for this study 
and for the continuous willingness to discuss and answer questions, in particular to Thomas Schmid and 
Marco Berg. Many thanks to Silvia Banfi, Marco Berg, Åsa Löfgren, Armin Schmutzler and Simon Mason 
for helpful comments. We are also grateful to the Climate-L and ResEcon list members who provided some 
of the literature on CO2 abatement costs. The usual disclaimer applies. 
 
Notes: 
 
1. Depending on the type of permit, e.g. differentiated by the delivery period; for data, see e.g. the links on 
CO2-Handel.de 2009. 
2. All monetary values originally given in Swiss Francs CHF were converted to €, using an exchange rate 
of 1€ ≈ 1.6 CHF.  
3. By 15% (3.81 m t CO2) for combustibles and 8% (1.24 m t CO2) for fuels. 
4. The current (as of September 2009) tax on gasoline in Switzerland is around 0.47 €/l (CH 2008); the 
price including the tax is currently around 1.00 €/l, which is lower than in most other European 
countries; Erdölvereinigung 2009, EC 2008. 
5. Project owners calculate additional costs for the whole project lifetime (net present value). They apply 
for all or a part of this to be funded by the CCF. This is then divided by expected reductions until 
2012. This gives the expected per ton price of reductions, which is the basis for the decision of the 
CCF that decides then to pay the full or only a part of the amount required. For some more 
information on the reference scenario, which is needed to calculate reductions and additional 
costs, see footnote 6. 
6. CCF (2006) describes in detail how the emissions and costs for the reference scenario have to be 
calculated and how the monitoring has to be organised. Standard methods for the project 
categories (cf. table 2) and values for key parameters (product life times, emission factors of 
different fuels, energy prices, etc.) are provided. Based on CCF (2006), new guidelines were 
developed that apply from 2008 onwards (BAFU 2008); therein, energy prices were updated, for 
example. Procedures are also geared to procedures from the Clean Development Mechanism. 
Clearly, the choice of the reference scenario is of paramount importance for the calculation of 
additional costs, the reductions achieved in a project and its additionality (if the assessment of this 
is not based on other barriers). The choice of the reference scenario is a complex task and not free 
of controversies. All values reported in this paper crucially depend on the reference scenarios 
chosen for the projects under consideration. In this paper, we do not address questions related to 
the additionality of the projects we investigate. 
7. The values communicated by the CCF were expert guesses to send some price signal or information on 
willingness to pay in a situation where no market for permits existed in Switzerland and where the 
CCF would be the only buyer of permits (personal communication CCF). 
8. The imputed project lifetime reported in the PDD. In reality, projects may operate even longer (cf. note 
“∆” for Table 3). 
9. t-test with the original and weighted data; this result emerges although the means seem quite different at 
first sight; the results of these t-tests have to be taken with caution as the number of observations 
are actually too low to reliably apply it: 79, 9 and less observations per group, no knowledge on 
the distribution and variances. 
10. It could for example happen that certain intermediaries systematically provide projects from a more 
expensive type - e.g. by being linked to a certain industry. Those could then still be cheaper than 
without intermediaries but would still be more expensive than other types. 
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11. Where costs are positive; the mitigation cost curve for the buildings sector has a large part with 
negative costs.  
12. We did not investigate the additionality of the CCF projects, though. There is also the fundamental 
critique of the CCF that it does not harvest the consumption effect of a policy measure, as it does 
not lead to reductions from emissions in the transport sector, which could realise with higher 
markups than 1 Eurocent per litre gasoline (e.g. OcCC 2004). 
13. This topic is concretely addressed in CCF (2009c), according to which two additional auctions are 
planned for 2009. They will pay for costs incurred due to emissions reductions from 2009 to 2013. 
The extension of payments beyond 2012 was decided to increase incentives for project developers. 
The reductions realised in 2013 will not be used for meeting emission reduction requirements of 
any contract with the Swiss government but are seen as a voluntary contribution of the CCF to 
abatement.  
14. PPP corrected values lie somewhat lower at € 37.- for GDP PPP; Interestingly, biomass-based district 
heating is not considered in this study and neither in the less detailed study on Switzerland, 
McKinsey 2009b. 
15. This is unlikely to be possible, but the legal status of these post 2012 reductions is not yet settled. In 
case these credits can be sold, double-selling may occur, as the CCF already covers a part of the 
additional costs that is larger than the share of reductions realised until 2012. 
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Tables: 
 
 
• the project belongs to one of the eligible categories (cf. table 2) 
• implementation of the project reduces domestic CO2-emissions that would not be 
reduced in absence of the project activity (i.e. emissions reductions are physically 
additional) 
• the project is financially additional 
• reductions realised by the end of 2012 can be calculated and measured 
• the minimal reduction requirements per channel will be achieved 
• project partners are involved on contractual basis only 
• financial requirements can be calculated 
• the project starts realising emissions reductions by January 1 2010 latest 
• financing the project is assured (accounting for the support by the CCF) 
• implementation of the project is possible (licenses, etc. required are available or will 
be so with highest probability) 
• emissions reductions are not subject to voluntary reduction targets under the CO2-law 
  
Table 1. Requirements in the single projects program of the CCF (CCF 2006) 
 
 33 
 
Category Examples 
Renewable heat 71 projects with a central heating station for district heating of 
several buildings. Reductions via replacement of fossil fuels 
with wood. Backup (for emergencies or extraordinary peak 
loads) is often fossil fuel (for 65% of these projects). 30 projects 
set up a new district heating distribution system, while 41 
consist in replacement or enlargement of existing systems. 3 
projects for heating or cooling in cheese production based on 
wood energy. 2 projects with heat pumps and one with solar 
collectors for heat production. 2 projects consist in building and 
operation of a production plant for biomass energy carriers. 
Waste heat utilization 3 projects using waste heat from industrial production and one 
from wastewater treatment for district heating. 1 project using 
waste heat from an ice-scating arena for an indoor swimming 
pool. 2 projects use waste heat from waste incineration for 
district heating and 2 projects use waste heat from industrial 
processes for other industrial processes within the same 
production unit. 
Efficiency (Industry) 2 projects of increased efficiency due to improved heat energy 
management in a school and a hospital. 
Renewable fuels 4 projects generating biogas from biomass, which then is used 
to substitute fossil gas. 
Efficiency (Fuel) 2 projects increasing aggregate car use fuel efficiency via 
mobility reorganisation and reduction (car-sharing platforms). 
Reductions are achieved by the claimed generally more 
environmental mobility pattern of car-sharing users 
(Interface/Infras 2006). 
 
Table 2. Projects in the single projects program of the CCF 
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Variable Definition Unit Mean value* Std. Dev.* Outliers 
total 
lifetime 
reduction∆ 
CO2 reductions over 
the total lifetime of the 
project 
t 12’941 14’556 at 513’160, 
597’363 
reductions 
until 2012 
reductions realized by 
the project until 2012 
t 3’662 4’895 76’974, 
81’250 (the 
same as 
above) 
total 
lifetime 
costs 
net present value of 
additional costs of the 
project over the whole 
lifetime, with respect 
to the reference 
scenario 
million 
€ 
0.56 0.81 - 
lifetime 
reduction 
costs per 
ton# (cLT) 
total lifetime costs 
divided by total 
lifetime reductions 
€/t 45.44† 30.13 at 280 (a 
different 
observation) 
reduction 
costs per 
ton until 
2012# 
(c2012) 
total lifetime costs 
divided by reductions 
until 2012 
€/t 160.56† 140.25 - 
payment 
by the 
CCF 
payments by the CCF 
to the project 
developer for the 
reductions realized 
until 2012 
million 
€ 
0.25 0.31 - 
payment 
by the 
CCF per 
ton# (pCCF) 
payments by the CCF 
to the project 
developer per ton 
reduction realized until 
2012 
€/t 63.1‡ 10.94 - 
coverage payment by the CCF 
divided by total 
lifetime costs 
% 0.52 0.30 - 
 
Table 3. Description of variables; the first two outliers are 8 and almost 10 times larger 
than the next lower value, the third is far less extreme at 1.7 times the next lower value (* 
without outliers; ∆ the project lifetime reported in the PDD is a calculatory quantity 
referring to the time period over which the physical capital is depreciated. Usually, 
installations remain in operation after this for some additional years and correspondingly 
produce additional reductions. This will reduce lifetime costs, but due to lack of data, we 
use the lifetime values reported in the PDD; # mean values and standard deviations are 
weighted with the relevant amount of reductions (lifetime or until 2012) - outliers in these 
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weights are also dropped (i.e. the first two); † including the outliers in total lifetime 
reduction, these mean values reduce to € 30.38 and 141.0, respectively. This is due to the 
strong influence of these observations via the weights; ‡ € 59.31 when including all three 
outliers) 
 
